Historical presence as a theoretical field: ontological, epistemological, and ethical dimensions after narrativism

Résumé

This article reconstructs the concept of historical presence in recent theory and philosophy of history by examining how the past can be experienced and represented as both present in remnants, things, traces, documents, and memorials, and absent because it is irretrievably gone. Focusing on post 2000 debates, it argues that historical presence can be clarified through two complementary definitions: an extensional definition that maps its principal philosophical lineages and branches, and an intensional definition that identifies its ontological, epistemological, and ethical dimensions. The study is organized into five sections: the periodization of the rise of presence; the methodological sample and classificatory framework; the classification of three major lineages—Heideggerian, non Heideggerian, and deconstructionist—through branches associated with Gumbrecht, Pereira and Araújo, Domańska, Froeyman, Runia, Ankersmit, Bevernage, Kleinberg, and Cunha; the comparative analysis of boundaries and mutual critiques among these lineages; and the placement of presence within the broader geography of contemporary theory of history and temporal studies. The study also benefits from bibliometric analysis and digital history resources, which strengthen its methodological scope. The article concludes that historical presence is not a unified doctrine but a contested theoretical field in which experience, representation, realism, spectrality, historical justice, and ethical responsibility are combined in distinct ways, thereby enriching contemporary historiographical reflection.